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This article outlines in general terms how the environment of 21st century transnational organised 
crime, terrorism and unconventional conflict is being shaped by information-related capabilities 
(IRCs) that foster global networked connectivity and asymmetric responses to conventional military 
supremacy. This article explores how the conceptual apparatus regarding the distinction between 
wartime and peacetime, as well as war zones and peace zones, which has been developed within the 
framework of international criminal law and humanitarian law, can contribute to military-strategic 
operational and capability concepts. Integration of these conceptual frameworks within strategic 
analysis can serve to promote the effective use of force within a full spectrum operational 
environment in which information, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance thresholds 
are being raised and where deeper understandings of the social dynamic that sustains ongoing 
fighting within a global information environment become increasingly feasible. In this context, this 
article suggests that law enforcement frameworks and approaches have a high threshold of 




This article outlines in general terms how the environment of 21st century transnational organised 
crime, terrorism and unconventional conflict is being shaped by information-related capabilities 
(IRCs) that foster global networked connectivity and asymmetric responses to conventional military 
supremacy. These dynamics challenge our ability to use existing legal and strategic conceptual 
frameworks in order to condition and determine responses that are not only effective, but, 
connected to this, appropriate. In particular, both the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
rights and the UK House of Commons Defence Committee have urged further clarity and consensus 
building as well as strategic plans for operationalising human rights law and the law of armed 
conflict, as the current state of affairs not only creates too much uncertainty for military personnel 
and human rights claimants, but is said to impede operational effectiveness. 
This article suggests that although the conventional conceptual apparatus regarding the distinction 
between wartime and peacetime, as well as war zones and peace zones, which has been developed 
within the framework of international criminal law and humanitarian law has yet to embrace fully 
the asymmetric strategies and unconventional means of increasing lethality fostered by global 
networked connectivity on the part of non-state actors; many of their fundamental principles and 
indicative guidelines may be integrated into aspects of our contemporary strategic thinking which 
seeks to describe the environment of conflict and the operations occurring within it (operating 
concepts), and which seeks to describe how the general shape of forces should be optimised within 
a full spectrum conflict environment (capability concepts). 
 
The practical benefit of incorporating developments within legal doctrine into strategic thinking is 
that they may be used, firstly, to understand better the complexity and diversity of our full spectrum 
and globalised operational environments, and, secondly, as a way of developing and conditioning 
effective strategic, operational and tactical responses to the dynamics of unconventional conflicts. 
This approach can serve to mitigate both the problems of low-level tactical and operational 
engagements causing civilian harm which may result in strategic costs, and the strategic approaches 
to conflict that cause them to escalate and spill-over. 
 
The 21st Century Operational Environment 
 
According to Charles Garraway, the distinction between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ ‘was never more than 
theoretical and in the last 50 years has broken down completely.’1 The practical significance of this 
distinction was noted recently by the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human rights which 
stated that the legal line between counter-terror law enforcement operations and the waging of war 
by military means risks becoming blurred, and stated that urgent clarification is needed, particularly 
about how the international legal frameworks of human rights law and the law of armed conflict 
apply to the use of lethal force abroad in counterterrorism operations. This is because the former 
has much stricter standards on the use of force than the latter in that lethal force may only be used 
where absolutely necessary and operations resulting in the use of lethal force must be planned and 
controlled in a way that minimises the risk of loss of life.2 Additionally, the UK House of Commons 
Defence Committee not only raised concerns about the lack of clarity and certainty that arise out of 
the tension and overlap between the law of armed conflict and human rights law on the part of 
military personnel and civilians, but also about what it described as the increased ‘judicialisation of 
war’, whereby legal scrutiny in coroners’ courts, public inquiries and cases brought under human 
rights law serve to impede the operational effectiveness of armed forces.3 Concerns such as these 
are exacerbated within operational theatres involving either brief or protracted low-intensity 
fighting between states and non-state actors, or between non- state actors, both within and also 
across territorial boundaries. 
 
In response to the conventional superiority of many states, non-state actors increasingly appear to 
be adopting asymmetric strategies and unconventional means of fighting such as concealment 
within civilian populations and using clandestine networks, facilitated by modern IRCs, which enable 
operations to be conducted with increasing global reach and with increasing lethality. Due to the 
complex, diffuse and fluid nature of threats within the 21st century environment, it has been 
increasingly difficult to characterise situations as a prerequisite to applying the appropriate legal 
frameworks, as well as to devise appropriate strategic operating and capability concepts as a basis 
for employing effective responses or lines of operations, namely those that are not purely 
conventional military operations in character.4 Within a single operational theatre or area of 
operations, there are likely to be different types of armed confrontation reaching the threshold of an 
armed conflict of an international and/or non- international character. Further complicating this is 
violence that may be associated with terrorism, uprisings, organised crime, public disorder or petty 
crime that does not reach the threshold of an armed conflict or which is connected with surrounding 
hostilities. 
 
Broadly speaking, the 21st century operational environment may thus frequently constitute a 
strategic and regulatory grey area, given that it may require a mix of combat, law enforcement and 
humanitarian activities as there is likely to be a full spectrum or continuum of violence ranging from 
petty crime to armed hostilities between states or between states and organised armed groups.5 
Further compounding the difficulties on how to respond effectively to grey zones of conflict and 
other situations of violence, unconventional operations may be protracted in nature as an outcome 
of asymmetric tactics whereby organised armed groups conceal themselves and lie dormant within a 
strategic geography that is civilianised and urbanised, but have a much larger tactical reach in that 
they may be globally connected to complex and diffuse networked structures that can achieve 
physical effects with increasing lethality, in an opportunistic fashion, at any time and in any place, 
and which may not be amenable to conventional military approaches. 
 
The Global Information Environment 
 
An important definition of the concept of an information environment is as follows: ‘the aggregate 
of individuals, organisations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information’,6 
as well as a group’s IRCs, which are defined as ‘tools, techniques, or activities using data, 
information, or knowledge to create effects and operationally desirable conditions within the 
informational, physical and cognitive dimensions of the information environment’.7 
Counterinsurgency doctrine defines the ‘information dimension’ as the place where the physical and 
cognitive dimensions interact, or, in other words, the place where information is collected, 
processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected; the physical dimension comprises 
targetable command and control systems in the real, tangible world such as information systems, 
human beings (including decision makers, leaders, and military forces), and organisations as well as 
the supporting infrastructure and physical networks (microwave towers, computers, smart phones) 
that connect them and which enable individuals and organisations to create effects, and to conduct 
operations across air, land, maritime, space and cyberspace domains and across national, economic, 
and geographical boundaries;8 the cognitive dimension is defined as existing in the minds of 
individuals such as those who plan, instigate or order, or those who follow them. It is the dimension 
where people think, perceive, visualise, influence and decide, and includes their values, ideologies, 
ideas, beliefs, intentions, motivations, influences, decisions and perceptions.9 Accordingly, the 
cognitive dimension is viewed as the most important component of the information environment 




Global networked connectivity brings countries, groups and people around the world closer 
together. It has a stimulating effect on crises and conflicts in that it provides for the freer flow of 
weaponry, information and finances for groups and individuals. It allows them to have wider 
strategic and operational effects than in the past.11 The ability to create and control the flow of 
information brings with it organisational, doctrinal, strategic and tactical advantages that serve to 
challenge conventional legal and strategic frameworks and responses. In 1998 John Arquilla et al. 
suggested that network-based conflict and crime will become major phenomena in the decades 
ahead and that modern communications tools foster global networks which increasingly enable 
small and dispersed groups to communicate, coordinate and achieve effects such as armed violence 
outside areas that they physically control and without a precise central command or hierarchy.12 
Testimony to this are the recent writings of Burke, Kilcullen and Atwan. 
According to Burke, networked connectivity allows for three main types of network to operate and 
constantly adapt. Firstly, there are major groups or networks that are able to organise a centralised 
command structure in order to resource and coordinate large-scale military operations, and to 
control territory as well as to incorporate subnetworks. For example, Islamic State has been able to 
integrate a number of Sunni militant networks into its pre- existing overarching networks. Secondly, 
there are smaller networked militant groups that have some degree of organised structure. Affiliates 
may have allegiance to and follow orders from major groups, whereas independents or factions may 
act autonomously of the central leadership of a major network or merely offer loose support. There 
is an increasing trend of affiliates and independents establishing links and loose coalitions with each 
other in order to coordinate their operations without directly involving the senior leadership of a 
major network. Thirdly, there are self-radicalised individuals or small groups that are not directly 
connected to major groups or smaller militant groups, but who plan and carry out acts of violent 
extremism, sometimes in the name or ideology of major groups, or engage in non-violent extremism 
online.13 
 
According to Kilcullen, major groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State are exploiting developments 
in IRCs, such as social media, smart phones, YouTube and Google Earth to disseminate propaganda 
which instigates isolated acts of violent extremism, as well as to develop new and dynamic forms of 
command and control over diffuse transnational networks to a greater degree. ICRs enable the 
widespread, but often seemingly isolated, use of guerrilla or unconventional warfare techniques – 
not just the ‘expeditionary approach’ of organising in one country, training in another, then 
infiltrating the target country, but forming cells within countries, evading law enforcement agencies 
and international travel security measures and carrying out small-scale but mass-casualty attacks.14 
Similarly, Atwan notes that modern IRCs have enabled Islamic State to develop and expand a ‘digital 
caliphate’ in cyberspace, which has enabled it to network with individuals and groups around the 
world so as to finance and direct simultaneous and protracted acts of violence that range from 
small-scale attacks to large-scale military operations. Atwan suggests that part of the reason for this 
is that Islamic State’s online social media and publications have enabled it to influence, recruit, train 
and operationalise a vast target audience around the world by inculcating a shared ideology and 
militant praxis. According to Atwan, off-the-shelf anonymity products have facilitated the 
development and survivability of this ‘digital caliphate’.15 
In this complex and cluttered information environment, it is vital to engage in social network analysis 
of individuals and groups within networks and to assess the information that is being disseminated 
in order to determine how it affects the capabilities of actors to engage in armed hostilities as 
opposed to criminal acts of terrorism. Strategically, it will be increasingly important, and difficult, to 
distinguish violent networked 
insurgencies that result in effects rising to the level of an armed conflict from the networked 
mobilisation of civil society resulting in, or occurring within, a context of isolated attacks, potentially 
on a long-term basis.16 It will be a constant challenge for social network analysts to identify what we 
can conceive of as hierarchical or centralised forms of coordinated military organisation. They will 
have to be constantly on the lookout for new, dynamic and adaptive forms of organisation and ways 
of linking actors and groups within belligerent networks, as these are increasingly not based on 
formal hierarchical and networked structures of command and control involving two-way 
communication systems or face-to-face interaction for disseminating plans and orders. 
Furthermore, the cluttered information environment, mass use of social media and sophisticated 
‘off-the-shelf’ encryption tools and techniques, especially for propaganda, makes it harder to detect 
those actors who are recruiting, training and planning potentially numerous attacks with long lead 
times, as well as to detect concerted efforts to this effect.17 In this regard, understanding the 
precise nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organisations and systems that 
collect, process, disseminate, or act on information, is essential in order to assess whether or not 
there is a state of internal or transnational non-international armed conflict in existence, and, if not, 
to respond by using and developing law enforcement methods at the domestic and international 
levels. It is suggested that, the constant evolution of terrorist methods, financing using internet-
based systems, quickly renders counterterrorist measures obsolete, we need to remain vigilant 
about understanding the social dynamic that underlies both criminal activity and warfighting, in 
order that we do not over extend the permissive framework due to political and military expediency. 
Kilcullen suggests that the advances made in cloud computing, complex systems theory, big data 
analysis, remote observation and crowd-sourced analytics are enabling us to map and gain insights 
into virtual/human support networks as well as complex patterns of violence far more easily than in 
the past.18 Strategically, we must use these to gain a clear understanding of the transnational 
information environment at any given time so as to identify the adaptive and unconventional 
methods of command and control, and to assess whether a group’s organisational, fighting and 
logistical abilities mean that it has the ability to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations in such a way that exceeds the capacity of law enforcement agencies to respond.19 
 
The Virtual Theatre of Conflict 
 
The global information environment also undermines our spatial or geographical conception of a 
war zone.20 In other words, it is increasingly difficult for policy makers as well as military strategists 
and lawyers to ensure that ‘war zones’ or areas of operations, and thus law of war permissions, are 
confined to areas where military forces are physically located and directly engaged with enemy 
forces. In turn, this makes it a challenge to resist spill- over into ‘peace zones’ where the intensity of 
violence generally does not reach the threshold of a non-international armed conflict, but which 
nevertheless contains concealed and supportive elements of a transnational network that are 
virtually connected to the zone(s) where armed conflicts are physically located, and where physical 
effects are produced by virtue of a range of indirect support roles that are performed remotely using 
IRCs from outside the territorial boundaries or strategic geography within which conflict physically 
occurs. Support functions within a ‘virtual theatre’ may include command and control, logistical 
support, the dissemination of intelligence of a military nature, the recruitment and training of 
individuals, and even the provision financial support. 
 
Approaching the Complexity of the Information Environment 
 
Increasingly, traditional conceptual frameworks that are framed around single threats or simple 
binary distinctions may not be regarded as being fit for a complex information environment which 
comprises diverse actors within diffuse networks that are competing for influence and control, and 
which are able to use IRCs to adapt their various activities with greater ease, frequency, reach and 
lethality.21 Accordingly, concepts and capabilities should be developed and employed so that 
adequate assessments can be formed as to whether the command and control, organisational, 
fighting, information and logistical abilities of a group or network mean that it has the ability to carry 
out protracted military operations in such a way that actually exceeds the capacity of law 
enforcement agencies to respond.22 If not, then it is questionable as to whether we can legally 
define the situation(s) as constituting an armed conflict and apply conventional military approaches 
within the framework of the law of armed conflict without this ultimately being strategically 
counter-productive. Indeed, it has been argued that conventional military approaches adopted since 
the beginning of the 21st Century have turned out to be ‘a strategic failure’ and ‘represent nothing 
less than the collapse of Western counterterrorism strategy’ as they have cost us our ‘strategic 
freedom of action and eroded the legitimacy of a cause that, at the outset, enjoyed huge global 
support’ and have created ‘a stronger and more motivated, more dangerous enemy’.23 Although 
forming a definitive snapshot of the operational environment as a basis for predicting and forming 
the necessary responses may not be possible in such a complex information environment that is in a 
constant state of flux,24 it is still necessary to optimise forces for this environment by developing an 
astute situational understanding in any given situation. 
Accordingly, for legal and strategic responses to be effective and appropriate in this complex 
environment, their conceptual frameworks should complement each other and be used to form 
assessments that constantly remain abreast of how actors are using IRCs to adapt asymmetric 
strategies and unconventional methods in order to produce effects within the physical domain. This 
can be done through continuing to develop and employ information, target acquisition and 
reconnaissance capabilities (ISTAR) that can improve the threshold and accuracy with which threats 
can be detected by, firstly, ensuring that adequate information gathering capabilities exist and that 
information can be integrated, processed, and disseminated at strategic, operational and tactical 
levels of command;25 and, secondly, ensuring that there are personnel at all levels who have 
adequate cultural and linguistic understanding so that the social dynamic that sustains fighting can 
be understood and so that the cognitive dimension, comprising individual and group intentions and 
motivations, can be understood, and to tailor force size, structure and capabilities to respond quickly 
to operational environments that are rapidly changing and to tailor rules and effects that are 
appropriate to the circumstances.26 Even though global connectivity renders it increasingly difficult 
to create legal, strategic and operational boundaries between ‘peace zones’ and ‘war zones’, this 
article suggests that we should use and develop legal frameworks on conflict classification to ensure 
that the physical domain of the paradigm of hostilities does not track and extend out into the 
peripheries of the virtual domain, especially because, as noted by Kilcullen, this can draw in 
populations and forces anywhere on the planet that have no geographical connection to the conflict, 
in the sense of being directly involved in conduct or support.27 
 
The Strategic Importance of the Legal Characterisation of Conflict 
 
Legal characterisations and conceptual frameworks applicable to a situation or state of affairs are of 
practical relevance to strategic thinking and analysis as they establish the legal frameworks within 
which military operations, and, increasingly, information operations, take place. Their integration 
into strategic thinking and analysis can serve to avoid strategic failures and defeats, such as those 
where relatively calm situations are escalated and become far more dangerous; where targeted 
killings or tactical overreactions could be based on manipulation or intelligence failures, for example, 
being used by one faction against another as part of a vendetta or dispute;28 or where targeters 
make ‘positive identification errors’ because they erroneously presume civilian behaviour to be 
hostile or suspicious or because they have differing interpretations of what it means directly to 
participate in hostilities or be a member of an organised armed group – issues which are beyond the 
scope of this enquiry.29 
The law of armed conflict is similar to human rights law in that individuals can be targeted using 
lethal force for such time as they pose a direct and immediate lethal threat, e.g. in self-defence. 
Where they differ is that within a situation of armed conflict, individuals can also be targeted at any 
time and in any place where they have the status of a member of an organised armed group 
exercising a continuous combat function, i.e. they lose their civilian status and need not represent a 
direct and immediate lethal threat at the time of attack. In general terms, human rights law does not 
tolerate such intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force unless absolutely 
necessary. Furthermore, the transition to the framework of hostilities opens the way to law of war 
permissions on the use of force that are much more permissive than human rights standards when it 
comes to taking precautions in attack and scrutinising incidental loss of life, injury and damage. 
Determining the overall legal framework is both a major protection issue as well as a vital strategic 
consideration. Where attacks are perceived as indiscriminate or as causing excessive incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, then these 
tactical or operational issues may have strategic costs which undermine the effectiveness of the use 
of conventional military force. The legal frameworks of law enforcement and hostilities serve to 
condition the nature and extent of force that is permissible, and may therefore act as a safeguard 
against inappropriate types and degrees of force which military doctrine recognises as having the 
potential to be counter-productive, for example, by serving to escalate crises or conflicts which 
render the return to peace and public order unnecessarily difficult. Connected to this, the 
application of one legal framework instead of another serves to establish common standards and 
expectations in the context of information operations within a complex global information 
environment. In what is often described as ‘lawfare’, the resort to legal norms may be used by 
governments in order to clarify an justify, for example, why the legal framework of armed conflict, 
rather than the human rights based framework of law enforcement, applies to the use of lethal force 
in order to manage public opinion in response to the effects of operations that occur at the tactical 
level of war, especially where they can be manipulated by one side of an asymmetric conflict in 
order to contribute to or cause adverse strategic consequences. 
 
As the use of conventional military force in ‘grey area’ operational theatres that are increasingly 
civilianised and urbanised, such as counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, has the 
potential to create civilian harm that may easily be perceived as excessive, it is suggested that our 
legal and strategic conceptual frameworks should be used together in order to prevent the 
framework of hostilities from ‘coming down’ from its high threshold of applicability into situations of 
social crisis or public emergency, as this could serve unduly to legitimise targeted killings and the use 
of high-intensity means and methods of conventional military force across a range of low- intensity 
hostilities. 
 
Situational Classification Criteria Developed within International Criminal Law 
 
The indicative guidelines developed within international criminal law for determining the existence 
of a non-international armed conflict will now be discussed, given that they constitute useful tools 
for forming appropriate and effective strategic pictures and responses, and, in particular, for 
assessing whether or not conventional military lines of operations are likely to be appropriate in any 
given area of operations. It is suggested that where the criteria given below have not been 
established, then human rights based law enforcement lines of operations should be employed.30 
 
The Intensity Criterion 
Pertinent to the issue of identifying where the framework of law enforcement cannot be expected to 
operate are whether the hostilities are of a sufficient intensity to qualify as an armed conflict.31 
Another way of putting this is whether the hostilities can be considered sufficiently serious and 
whether there has been an increase in and a spread of armed clashes over territory and over a 
period of time.32 In this regard account ought to be taken of the casualty levels33 and the extent of 
the destruction34 caused by the fighting as well as the effect of hostilities on civilians, for example, 
by forcing them to flee from combat zones, and whether civilians and/or civilian objects have been 
subject to direct or indiscriminate attacks.35 
 
An assessment should be made as to whether it has been necessary to increase the size of 
government armed forces in response to the intensity of violence, as well whether there has been 
significant mobilisation and distribution of weapons among both parties to the conflict.36 Indicators 
in this regard include whether it has been necessary to increase troop and unit deployment 
numbers, the formation and change of front lines between belligerent parties,37 and whether it is 
necessary to use high intensity ‘weapons of war’ such as ‘heavy weapons and other military 
equipment, such as tanks and other heavy vehicles’.38 Also relevant to the issue of mobilisation of 
forces and matériel is whether it has been necessary to employ military tactics and formations, such 
as the mass deployment of forces to a crisis area, the closure of roads and the blocking and 
encirclement of conurbations and the use of mortar or artillery fire against them.39 Another key 
factor that is relevant to the intensity criterion is whether international organisations such as the UN 
Security Council have become involved over concerns about the situation presenting a threat to 
domestic, regional and international stability, and whether any resolutions have been passed in this 
regard.40 
 
An account of the intensity or seriousness of hostilities may also take place at a more systematic 
level in order to build up a common operational picture.41 Strategic analysis should consider the 
policy decisions, on a whole nation basis and across military hierarchies, that lie behind the way that 
organs of the State, such as the police and military, use force against armed groups at various levels. 
The rationale of this systemic approach is that such considerations may indicate that it has been 
necessary to make a tactical and operational shift away from the framework of law enforcement to 
that of armed conflict because the former has become unfeasible or too dangerous in the 
circumstances.42 In this regard, account may be taken of the nature of the orders and instructions 
given to forces engaging in clashes with organised armed groups, and whether forces are limited to 
using force that is ‘no more than absolutely necessary and which is strictly proportionate to certain 
objectives’ or whether forces have been permitted to use lethal force under broader and more 
permissive rules of engagement.43 This is particularly important in grey area situations where there 
has been no formal declaration of war or state of emergency. In such instances, an analysis of orders 
and instructions running down a chain of command may be probative of tactical and operational 
assessments that the intensity and seriousness of the violence is such that the law enforcement 
model is too restrictive of the use of force, and that the framework of armed combat has become 
necessary to restore control, public order and security. However, in an environment that is diverse, 
given the diversity of actors involved, and ambiguous, given the range of lethal capabilities at the 
disposal of non-state actors, we may also, where feasible, look to the devolved situational 
awareness and decision capabilities made at lower levels of military hierarchies. This is because they 
may be optimised at the tactical and small-unit levels so that forces can effectively identify and 
respond to threats in fast-changing and chaotic situations. 
 
In this way, tactical and operational decisions are part of a number of factors that may go towards a 
broad assessment of how the underlying state of affairs should be qualified and responded to and 
how strategic assessments need to be open to operational and tactical assessments. The existence 
of these factors suggests that the law enforcement paradigm consisting of individualised threat 
assessments and law enforcement techniques may no longer be practicable, and so we must 
introduce the framework of hostilities out of military necessity. 
 
The challenge for making assessments in this area is that states will respond to exceptional 
circumstances, such as terrorism cases, in a range of ways. Some states may respond through their 
ordinary criminal procedures, whilst others have established exceptional procedures and rules on 
the use of force, detention, evidence and trial procedure that are enforced through specialised or 
even military courts.44 In order to assess whether or not this law enforcement paradigm is 
practicable, we need to assess whether the police, prosecutorial and judicial institutions and their 
general or specialised law enforcement tools can operate effectively in the face of the exceptional 
circumstances within the overall security environment. To this effect, the United Nations 
Counterterrorism Committee has provided technical guidance to states which would suggest that 
exceptional criminal procedures and special investigative tools can be employed across a broad 
spectrum of serious criminality, including serious organised crime and terrorism. 
 
Factors that may be taken into account in assessing whether law enforcement mechanisms have the 
systemic capabilities to respond to exceptional challenges include whether the police, prosecution 
and judicial services have the capability to guide, instruct and supervise the work of the investigatory 
agencies and whether the police/military investigators themselves can operate within in the security 
environment: for example, there may be ‘no go’ areas for the police/military, precluding them from 
gathering evidence, carrying out crime scene investigations, interviewing victims and witnesses; 
from controlling the use of special investigative techniques by investigative and prosecutorial 
agencies; from handling complex cases involving conspiracy, charity law, finance, and human rights 
as well as being able to map out complex networks and typologies of incitement and recruitment; 
from handling and securing forensic, technological and financial aspects of investigation and 
prosecution; from cooperating internationally both formally and informally; from executing correctly 
mutual legal assistance and extradition requests; from supervising the use of special investigative 
techniques by the investigative agencies; from handling intelligence collected by the different 
investigative agencies and converting it into admissible evidence when appropriate; from handling 
evidence collected by different States; from accessing special training or educational programmes 
concerning criminal networks and criminal financing; from accessing intelligence and intelligence 
techniques such as covert surveillance and infiltration; from handling anti-terrorist financing 
measures (for example, freezing, confiscation); from responding to transnational crimes that can 
support or facilitate terrorist activity; from handling witness protection for victims, witnesses and 
collaborators before during and after statements and testimony are given, bearing in mind that they 
will be subject to intimidation and death threats; from handling investigative and pre-trial detention 
of suspects, potentially in large numbers, in accordance with procedures established in law, without 
having to resort to prolonged or indefinite periods of detention due to security risks or political 
exigencies and without causing the security situation to escalate further in intensity; from running 
special courts and court procedures, without necessarily resorting to military courts, and ensuring 
that there are fair, and, where possible, public trials by independent and impartial tribunals (that is, 
investigating and judicial authorities that are, and are seen to be, operationally independent of the 
military chain of command).45 
 
The Organizational Criterion 
The second factor to consider in assessing whether a strategic decision should be made to operate 
within the framework of the law of armed conflict is whether a network has the requisite level of 
organisation. The more organised a network is, the greater the threat it represents, and therefore 
the greater the challenge it will be for the ‘normal’ framework of law- enforcement to respond. This 
organisational prerequisite is an important factor to consider in determining whether standard 
means and methods of law enforcement are inadequate, and military means and methods are 
therefore needed to re-impose public order, or, in other words, whether an armed group forms part 
of a network that is so well organised that it exceeds the capacity of law-enforcement mechanisms 
to respond. Zemach frames this in a slightly more nuanced fashion by describing situations that 
exceed the capacity of the law enforcement model as those which generally preclude the possibility 
for individualised threat assessments and law enforcement techniques.46 
 
In these ways, the organisational criterion is related to the intensity criterion, but it is also an 
important element in its own right in that the law of armed conflict framework can only apply in a 
pragmatic and functional sense where a group has the requisite organisational structure and 
capabilities. Thus, in general terms, to constitute an organised armed group, there needs to be 
‘some hierarchical structure’ and furthermore the ‘leadership requires the capacity to exert 
authority over its members’.47 Thus, for the law of armed conflict to apply, basic organisational 
features need to be in place so that it can. In this regard, ‘[s]ome degree of organisation by the 
parties will suffice to establish the existence of an armed conflict’ and that ‘[t]he leadership of the 
group must, as a minimum, have the ability to exercise some control over its members’.48 Without 
this functional pre- requisite in place, it may be suggested that ‘those who regard its actions as mere 
acts of anarchy or brigandage are right’,49 which in turn suggests that a law enforcement model is 
the appropriate and necessary legal and policy framework with which to regulate the use of force in 
response to ‘irregular, anarchic armed groups with no responsible command’.50 
 
In general terms, it may be suggested that ‘irregular, anarchic armed groups with no responsible 
command’ may not exceed or undermine the capacity of an intelligence-led and evidence-based law 
enforcement model to respond, as they are not sufficiently organised to confront police and military 
forces with military means. However, they do not need to be ‘as organised as the armed forces of a 
State’ in order to satisfy the organisational criterion and they do not need to control territory.51 
Five indicative and interrelated criteria of what constitutes a sufficient degree of organisation on the 
part of a non-state group for it to exceed the capacity for law enforcement mechanisms are now 
outlined.52 Firstly, there must be some form of command structure in place. This may be evidenced 
by the existence of what can be regarded as a ‘general staff’ or a ‘high command’ which can issue 
political statements and communiqués as well as organise personnel, logistics and weapons, such as 
by appointing personnel to specific roles or tasks, giving orders and authorising military 
operations.53 This command structure must enable a ‘high command’ to receive reports from all 
operational units within the chain of command and to establish and disseminate internal regulations 
that set out the hierarchical organisation and structure of the armed group in terms of roles and 
duties at each level of the chain of command.54 Secondly, for a group to qualify as being ‘organised’, 
it must have the ability to carry out military operations in an organised fashion and control territory. 
Factors to consider in this regard are whether the group has the ability to establish a ‘unified military 
strategy’ so as to be able to conduct large scale or protracted military operations, whether it has ‘the 
capacity to control territory’ (rather than actually controlling it), and whether ‘there is territorial 
division into zones of responsibility’. Furthermore, there must be some evidence that commanders 
and operational units can ‘co-ordinate their actions’ and effectively disseminate ‘written and oral 
orders and decisions’.55 Thirdly, an organised armed group is one which has a sufficient level of 
logistical and organisational capabilities. For example, an assessment is to be made of a group’s 
ability to recruit new members and to provide them with military training and to control and 
organise the supply of weapons and uniforms as well as its ability to link and co-ordinate all levels of 
the chain of command through a communications system.56 Fourthly, an armed group must also be 
sufficiently organised so as to ensure a level of discipline. Factors relevant in this respect include 
whether there is a system of internal regulations and disciplinary rules in place, as well as 
mechanisms such as proper training and supervision to ensure that they are disseminated to 
members of the organised armed group.57 Fifthly, we must consider whether the group or network 
has the ability to “speak with one voice” in the course of political negotiations.58 In this regard, 
account may be taken of the group’s capacity ‘to act on behalf of its members in political 
negotiations with representatives of international organisations and foreign countries’ as well as its 
ability to negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease fire or peace accords’.59 The existence 
of these organisational features may indicate that standard law enforcement means and techniques 
may not be able to remove or reduce the threat from an organised armed group. 
 
War and Peace in the Information Environment: An Application of the Intensity and Organisational 
Guidelines to Networked Conflicts 
 
This part of the discussion will now tentatively apply these indicative guidelines to operations that 
have occurred within the information environment in order to provide worked examples of how 
they can influence strategic assessments on whether to approach situations within the human rights 
based framework of law enforcement or within the framework of the law of armed conflict. 
 
Command and Control 
 
Increasingly, we see that IRCs, such as cell phones and social media, are used to plan and order 
attacks. In view of the indicative guidelines above, we need to examine whether the physical, 
information or cognitive dimensions present elements of a basic command structure with a 
recognised leader, structure and hierarchy, and internal regulations that establish a chain of 
command and disciplinary measures. A network analysis of the information environment may help 
us to understand the organisational dynamics and thus the nature of the threat that we face. 
Furthermore, it may help us to understand where the leadership resides and how it is distributed 
among members within the network.60 For example, Kilcullen notes that from mid- 2015, Islamic 
State wilayat networks had been established in Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen and Egypt. Rather than 
being viewed as mere guerrilla or terrorist groups, these were seen as formal territorial, legal and 
political entities with direct connections to a centralised caliphate organisation and a central figure 
by the name of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who was able to set out the overall aims and objectives of the 
group together with his two deputies, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani and Abu Ali al-Anbari, and a variety 
of advisory councils and departments such as the military council and the security and intelligence 
council. Through this effective chain of command over large fighting and auxiliary forces, Islamic 
State conducted operations within a set of defined strategic guidelines and collaborated with 
networks in neighbouring regions which were able to carry out larger, widespread and coordinated 
attacks in Syria, Libya and Iraq. Some of these were coordinated large scale attacks, whilst others 
were smaller self-radicalised attacks. Islamic State executive leadership began to establish territorial 
control comprising a network of cities linked by narrow strips of territory in Syria and Iraq and to 
carry out state like functions, such as running courts, taxation, public services as well as intelligence 
and security services. Islamic State has also been able to recruit and receive vast numbers of foreign 
fighters travelling to Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Somalia. In areas such as these, Islamic State 
represents more of a conventional military threat to other non-state actors as well as other states 
rather than a terrorist group per se. This is especially so that it can finance its operations from a 
diverse range of revenue streams such as control over oil fields, trafficking in weapons, drugs and 
artefacts, kidnapping and robberies. However, although major groups such as Islamic State and Al-
Qaeda may be able to launch conventional attacks in the Middle East, we must closely examine their 
links with peripheral actors and networks in other regions in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and USA 
as well as the roles and capabilities these peripheral actors are performing, in order to assess 
whether the overarching network has the organisational resources and capabilities to launch 
widespread and coordinated attacks in these regions.61 
 
Accordingly, at the strategic and operational levels, where a group’s IRCs allow for an identifiable 
leadership to plan, order and coordinate large-scale attacks, even if this is done remotely and by 
dispersed groups outside their physical control, then there is the potential for this to reach the level 
of transnational non-international armed conflict. However, it is important for there to be some 
control and effect over an insurgent network that exists in the physical and cognitive domains. It is 
suggested that there does not have to be complete control over these domains at all times, as this is 
not realistic in an information environment with a high degree of surveillance that compels groups 
to avoid detection by adopting diffuse structures.62 Accordingly, there may be no clear 
organisational structure that mirrors a conventional chain of command involving a core leadership, 
guerrillas, cadres, auxiliaries and underground cells. Thus, rather than a hierarchical leadership 
structure, the organisational structure may be diffusely networked within a complex and cluttered 
information environment involving a range of actors or entities that provide basic support functions 
and this network will be constantly learning and adapting.63 
 
In a networked organisation it is important to understand the roles that actors play in a network and 
the links that exist between them for financing, as well as providing tactical and operational support, 
to produce effects that are adverse to the military operations or military capacity of a party to an 
armed conflict or, alternatively, that inflict death, injury or destruction on persons or objects 
protected against direct attack. What we are looking for primarily are ‘critical actors’ or central 
points of communication or influence that have an influence or measurable impact on a network 
that is capable of carrying out military operations in the physical domain.64 Critical actors have a 
great influence over what flows through the network and are able, directly or indirectly, to influence 
other actors within that network.65 In particular, they will have a measurable impact upon what we 
may describe as underground ‘guerrilla units’ or ‘cells’ which are able to carry out small-unit tactical 
operations or which can mass or coordinate for larger operations, for example, directly recruiting 
and providing some tactical support or indirectly providing general guidance and support, thus 
enabling a pattern of individuals to self-recruit and operationalise in the name of the cause or 
strategy, for example, what may be described as a digital levée en masse or mass uprising.66 The 
information environment may indicate a highly centralised network that is dominated by one or 
more centralised actors. However, if these actors are removed or damaged, then the network may  
fragment into unconnected subnetworks.67 Where such fragmentation or disaggregation occurs 
then a decentralised network may result. A characteristic of this is that there is now no single point 
of failure, as operational and tactical decisions may be made by different actors within the network 
rather than by a central or critical actor. A major network may fragment into numerous subnetworks 
that have numerous connections to the operational environment, but not necessarily with each 
other. Here, subnetworks may have direct multiple connections with each other; they may have only 
very loose and indirect links with a few central actors and other subnetworks; they may now be 
completely isolated and freestanding.68 
 
Under such circumstances, it is important for us to gauge network density, which is a general 
indicator of how connected individuals are in a network – the more links that actors have to other 
actors within a network, the greater the density.69 Decentralised networks may have low network 
density and be complex to map. In other words, unlike a hierarchical network, low network density 
means that such networks are not acting as a unified force, but rather as a disaggregated and 
atomised force.70 Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that a central actor will be able to enforce 
discipline, ensure that orders are carried out and that there is compliance with internal rules or 
discipline. However, a central actor may still be able to issue general, albeit one-directional, 
ideological, operational and tactical guidelines to their target audience. They may still control what 
flows through the network and have great influence over peripheral actors without having direct 
links to them or direct influence over them.71 Kilcullen notes the contemporary phenomenon of 
self-recruited individuals or groups acting upon general directions, propaganda, tactics and 
techniques, usually disseminated openly on the internet by ‘symbolic’ or charismatic figures without 
their having to give any direct communication, support or coordination. Kilcullen terms this form of 
remote radicalisation and operationalisation as ‘leaderless resistance’. More specifically, the 
individuals and groups who carry out violence ranging from small acts of violent extremism to large-
scale military operations may be extremely peripheral in that they have no direct ties to central 
figures or networks and are operating in a clandestine fashion in foreign countries. Central figures do 
not have to establish a formal hierarchical structure or chain of command based upon two-way 
communication systems in order to disseminate secret plans and orders, but merely make public 
statements and general commands on YouTube or social media. These then become linked via social 
media platforms to other actors who issue detailed operational and tactical guidance enabling 
individuals or small groups to act autonomously and on their own initiative. For instance, Anwar Al-
Aulaqi was designated as a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’ because he was said to have 
provided financial, material or technological support for actors of terrorism that included recruiting, 
influencing and training persons to fight, such as Nidal Hassan, who fatally shot thirteen people and 
injured more than thirty others in the Fort Hood mass shooting on 5 November 2009, and Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab, who is popularly referred to as the ‘Underwear Bomber’. Al-Aulaqi is also said 
to have inspired the London 7/7 attacks as well as plots in Toronto in 2006 and Fort Dix in 2007 
through his sermons available on the internet and on DVD.72 
 
This state of affairs necessitates rigorous social network analysis of the information environment in 
order to understand the organisational dynamics of a network and its leadership. We need to 
identify the nature and scope of leadership and how it is distributed throughout a network. It may 
be that members have a high degree of autonomy which enables the network to avoid detection and 
increase its operational capabilities.73 It is suggested that even though central actors may be unable 
directly to enforce discipline, to ensure that orders are carried out and that there is compliance with 
humanitarian law, this is not necessarily detrimental to a networked group being sufficiently 
organised for the purposes of applying the paradigm of hostilities. Under such conditions, we should 
be careful to ensure that there is reliable intelligence that indicates a pattern of individuals or cells 
indirectly responding to and operating in a manner that is consistent with the general guidance 
issued by central actors (for example, by following instructional videos or audio files or training 
manuals and by publicly professing a commitment to the cause). Furthermore, in the absence of a 
hierarchical structure made up of a direct chain of command, we would need sufficient intelligence 
to demonstrate a pattern indicative of a unified fighting force, namely, that remote leadership is 
inculcating similar ideological, tactical and operational decisions and effects across a decentralised 
network. Where this is not the case, then this would indicate that the network does not constitute a 




Ability to Mount Protracted Operations 
 
We need to examine the information environment in order to assess whether a group’s information-
related capabilities and network dynamics enable it to conduct protracted or sustained and 
concerted military operations, such as manoeuvring fighters and carrying out coordinated hit and 
run operations. We need to examine whether IRCs are being used to coordinate military grade 
logistics, such as such as supplying weaponry and equipment, financing, providing military training 
and recruiting new members. There should be evidence in the information environment that a 
network has some unity and the ability to speak with one voice. In our modern information 
environment, IRCs, such as cell phones, text messaging, voice over internet protocol, GPS devices, 
Google Earth and the internet, are being used to organise and coordinate actors within networks. 
Urban populations within developing countries are now highly connected and networked, expanding 
their reach, influence and support.75 According to Kilcullen, the same connectivity that enables licit 
trade also enables people to self-organise in ‘dark networks’ where illicit trade, trafficking, piracy 
and terrorism flow.76 Furthermore, ‘dark networks’ may be used to enable violence across a 
spectrum ranging from criminal activity through to transnational terrorism and transnational non-
international armed conflict.77 Accordingly, we need to be careful in examining IRCs in order to 
assess whether they are being used to conduct coordinated and large scale military attacks, even by 
what may appear to be a decentralised and fragmented organisation in the physical domain.78 For 
example, Kilcullen notes that in the 2011 Libyan uprising, groups used social media platforms and 
networks through improvised satellite phones and internet uplinks for remote and decentralised 
command and control. The command system was distributed through multiple networks and remote 
platforms and was used to play a practical coordination and logistics function for self-organising 
corps of volunteers and non-state armed groups, for example, by developing a narrative or common 
cause, distributing military intelligence, tactical and operational guidance as well as sending out 
requests for assistance. According to Kilcullen, this allowed ‘a diverse movement of small groups, 
spread across several coastal cities to act in a unified manner against the regime, making this a true 
case of networked-enabled insurgency [with] supporters of the uprising from all over the world’. 
Effectively, Libya in 2011 was a novel example of a mass networked mobilisation emerging in 
cyberspace that had direct physical effects rising to the basic intensity threshold of an armed 
conflict.79 Thus, where a group’s IRCs allow for the detailed planning, organisation and coordination 
of attacks as part of large-scale military operations, then a group’s network may be regarded as 
sufficiently organised for the purposes of applying the paradigm of hostilities. 
Returning to the idea of network density, where the information environment reveals a high 
network density among a range of actors and entities, this would indicate that a group has the 
networked capabilities to conduct widespread, coordinated and protracted military operations. This 
means that they may be sufficiently organised to constitute a dangerous military threat and thus 
subject to the framework of hostilities.80 Accordingly, this involves an assessment of a network’s 
ability to share information in near real time, anonymously and securely, and then to act on it in a 
coordinated fashion.81 To this end, we would need intelligence regarding direct and/or indirect links 
between auxiliary cells and guerrilla cells as well as the ways in which a group is using IRCs to recruit, 
train and motivate followers, organise the logistics of weaponry and people as well as the financing 
of military operations.82 For example, we would need evidence that there are auxiliary cells that 
perform logistics operations such as maintaining safe houses, moving weapons, intelligence 
gathering, propaganda, recruitment and communications support.83 Auxiliaries may also include 
economic support systems that directly fund military and political operations, such as fund raising, 
unlawful appropriation, illicit trade and trafficking, banking and finance operations and laundering 
through businesses.84 We would need intelligence demonstrating that leadership and/or auxiliaries 
have direct and/or indirect ties to guerrilla units or cells that can conduct coordinated and 
protracted small-unit tactical military operations or which can mass for larger protracted military 
operations.85 For instance, the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008 saw a leadership cell operate from a 
safe house in Pakistan by giving intelligence, directions, instructions and warnings to small attack 
units on the ground in India by using Skype, SMS text messages and mobile phone calls. Although 
this caught Indian security forces by surprise and enabled attack forces to take diversionary 
countermeasures for a short period, ultimately it did not exceed the capacity of India’s 
counterterrorism force to contain the attackers eventually; this small-unit tactical operation was 
directed at civilians rather than a large military operation or a coordinated series of assaults against 
police or military forces.86 This can be contrasted with the unrest in Kingston in 2010 when 
Jamaican authorities attempted to enforce a US extradition request of Christopher Coke – the head 
of an international crime syndicate named ‘the Shower Posse’ which controlled the Tivoli Gardens 
area of Kingston and had previously attacked police stations. It exceeded the capacity of civilian law 
enforcement to respond as it required a full scale military effort lasting around a week and involving 
over a thousand police and soldiers engaged in house-to-house fighting with large numbers of 
casualties to gain control over Tivoli Gardens.87 Nevertheless, the situation was declared a state of 
emergency and, overall, it was treated as a law enforcement operation to arrest and extradite, 
rather than kill, Christopher Coke. He eventually pleaded guilty to racketeering and drug-related 
charges in a New York Federal Court. 
A decrease in network density indicates that a group is becoming fragmented and isolated and that 
its organisational ability is reduced. As a network’s capability to act as a unified fighting force is 
diminished, it becomes less of a military threat and more amenable to law enforcement methods. 
Furthermore, disaggregated and atomised groups are more difficult to detect and disrupt, and so 
may require a more intelligence-led and individualised social network assessment in order to 
understand their capabilities and the threat that they pose over time.88 Another complicating 
feature of social network analysis is that a network may be diffusely made up of a range of criminal, 
guerrilla and auxiliary entities as well individuals acting alone without any direct connections to any 
other individuals or groups within the network.89 Some of these entities may not be aware that they 
are playing indirect support roles within a network that contains belligerent elements. Changes to 
network density and belligerent functions across a network should be continuously monitored and 
mapped out over time allowing states to develop and change their tactics so that they are more in 
line with law enforcement operations as a group’s IRCs become reduced, its network becomes more 
fragmented and its military capabilities diminished.90 For example, Kilcullen notes that at the time 
of 9/11, Al-Qaeda had an organised and hierarchical network of commanders, committees, camps, 
groups and support networks. This high network density exposed it to attack, and so it quickly 
fragmented and developed forms of ‘leaderless resistance’ using IRCs to influence target audiences 
to support its efforts and to mount attacks. This process of disaggregation led to a proliferation of 
smaller attacks from isolated groups, factions and affiliates. However, as seen with Islamic State, its 
major networks have been able to disaggregate under aerial bombardment and move into safe 
zones, only to reform and expand military capabilities in and across new areas.91 
 
However, even where network density is low and its elements are atomised, in our modern 
information environment the network may still be able to carry out what amounts to tacitly 
coordinated military operations where central or critical actors issue general and one-way 
operational and tactical guidelines that are operationalised and acted upon by isolated but free-
standing and autonomous individuals, auxiliaries, guerrilla units or underground cells. Under such 
circumstances isolated subnetworks may have their own leadership, fighters and auxiliary forces, 
enabling them to mount widespread attacks.92 Kilcullen notes that groups such as Al-Qaeda and 
Islamic State are increasingly disseminating their tactics and techniques via online magazines, such 
as ‘Inspire’ and ‘Dabiq’ which enable individuals and groups to operationalise and mount attacks 
without any direct contact or formal membership of a terrorist organisation.93 Under such 
circumstances, it may be sufficient for individuals or cells to act in a manner that is consistent with 
general guidance without the need for further centralised operational and tactical support and 
coordination as long as there is intelligence revealing a pattern to this effect. It may be the case that 
there is a small networked group with actors on the periphery with very few, if any, links to this 
central core. This may be the case where there is a group within one country and a number of ‘lone 
wolf’ actors on the periphery in other countries. This would tend to indicate that the organisation 
has a low network density and has a weak connection to its centre. In order to understand the 
nature of the threat they present, it is important to examine the nature and scope of their 
connection to a central network as well as networks outside the theatre of operations and in order 
to assess whether they contribute to the efficiency, cohesion and operational capability of a 
network.94 In this regard it is important to make a cautionary note in that global connectivity has 
increased the threat of ‘home-grown terrorists’, whereby individuals and groups become remotely 
radicalised and organised online through propaganda on social networks and social media, very 
often with little or no face-to-face contact with foreign terrorist groups, and gain basic training on 
tactics and weaponry to carry out small scale attacks. Many, if not most, of these remotely organised 
plots and attacks do not represent a strategic or military threat to their countries as they are 
disaggregated and atomised individuals or cells which are amenable to counterterrorism operations 
by law enforcement agencies, that is unless they begin to become more widespread, coordinated 
and protracted, which is generally not the case at present due to Western and European domestic 
counterterrorism efforts. For example, Kilcullen suggests that in some instances, attacks may not be 
viewed as a single terrorist incident, but rather as one part of a sustained campaign of guerrilla 
warfare. This might be said of the Paris attacks of January and November 2015. However, Kilcullen 
argues that although they represent an escalation in terms of the guerrilla means and methods of 
warfare, and although there is evidence linking the Paris attacks to a transnational support network 
as well as attacks in other countries, it is suggested that these are not sufficiently widespread, 
networked or intense enough to rise to the level of a transnational armed conflict. Furthermore, 
even though individuals or groups acting in the name of Islamic State increasingly claim 
responsibility for attacks, there is often little or no evidence to suggest that they actually planned, 
resourced and coordinated attacks. Accordingly, it is suggested that many instances of what Kilcullen 
describes as ‘leaderless resistance’, ‘guerrilla terrorism’ and ‘remote radicalisation’ are to be 
situated within the framework of law enforcement. Just because actors or small networks can 
remotely radicalise and launch attacks in the belief that they are part of a bigger network does not 
mean that they are actually part of a network that can launch widespread and coordinated 
operations in the face of a system of law enforcement that can effectively respond to this complex 
threat, whilst at the same time upholding human rights and civil liberties. This is an important issue 
given that we will be dealing with these types of threat over a long period of time and so we must 
resist attempts to aggregate atomised attacks and plots into a persistent and long-term armed 
conflict.95 Similarly Atwan and Burke suggest that although Islamic State has developed a global 
jihadist network in cyberspace, this may not translate into a network that has military capabilities or 
the ability to create effects in the physical dimension. Instead, it may be regarded as a set of 
subnetworks that create effects, most of which do not rise above the level of what we could 
describe as non-violent or even violent extremism, which expresses similar if not shared ideas and 
statements. Individuals may republish propaganda on social media, condone militant activities in 
comments on or profess allegiance or sympathy on YouTube.96 
 
As the notion of a ‘conflict zone’ is unclear within both legal and strategic frameworks, and thus the 
geographical scope of application is unclear, it is suggested that social network analysis is important 
to try and confine ‘war zones’ to physically confined areas where fighting forces are engaged 
directly, and to resist spill-over into ‘peace zones’, where the intensity of violence does not reach the 
intensity suggested above in the indicative guidelines, but that may contain concealed and 
supportive elements of a unified virtual network. However, even though global connectivity renders 
it increasingly difficult to create legal, strategic and operational boundaries between such zones, we 
should constantly attempt to ensure that the physical domain of the paradigm of hostilities does not 
track and extend out into the peripheries of the virtual domain, as this creates the risk that the 
conduct of hostilities paradigm can spill over and prevail outside combat zones. In this sense ‘virtual 
theatres’ can serve to undermine the spatial conception of a war zone.97 This renders the 
requirement that a group controls territory or has the ability to do so even more critical in setting 
out spatial bounds of the paradigm of hostilities, and we must closely scrutinise the ability of central 
actors to maintain direct and continuous connectivity with coordinated fighting units over vast 
virtual networks which create effects in the physical domain of hostilities. Where actors are 
‘virtually’ in a remote ‘war zone’, but physically present in a ‘peace zone’ that is geographically 
disconnected from actual hostilities, then we should consider whether law enforcement methods 
and international cooperation are sufficient to respond to the ‘virtual threat’ that they present in 
their peace zone, and, if not, then ensure that any targeted killing is as attenuated as possible so as 
to be in accordance with what is justifiable on the basis of law of war targeting principles and self-
defence. However, outside the context of an international armed conflict, the city, region or country 
where they are residing should not be treated as a war zone subject to the paradigm of hostilities. 
Where individuals and underground cells are self-recruited and freestanding, it will be extremely 
difficult to demonstrate that a ‘critical actor’ has caused their actions and that they are actually part 
of networked organisation that can adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a 
party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or 
objects protected against direct attack. Central networks may claim responsibility for attacks, but 
this may often be mere pretence. It will also be a challenge to identify the ability of a network to 
‘speak with one voice’ and for central actors to ensure uniform disengagement from a digital levée 
en masse. Whilst certain parts of a network may be disrupted or neutralised, other parts may 
continue fighting or lie dormant and opportunistically launch an attack where the opportunity arises. 
This suggests that such an organisation will be more amendable to law enforcement methods.98 
 
Assessing Belligerent Nexus in the Information Environment 
 
In an unconventional environment it is a major challenge to establish a nexus between an individual 
and any surrounding hostilities, either on the basis of their direct participation in hostilities or their 
membership of an organised armed group, in order to categorise them as a lethal threat. Where an 
individual does not constitute a direct and immediate lethal threat, recourse will have to be made to 
the information and cognitive dimensions in order to ascertain their intentions and motivations, as, 
more often than not, this will be the decisive issue when it comes to targeting on the basis of status 
and ensuring that it is done legitimately and lawfully. This requires us to understand the information 
environment in order to build up a picture not only of an armed group but also of the population in 
which it resides. We must engage in social network analysis to build up an intelligence picture of the 
‘social dynamic that sustains ongoing fighting’, how individual actors interact with one another and 
how networks are being used for warfighting. In most civilianised operational environments, this will 
require an individual-level analysis, and the IRCs that states have at their disposal render this 
practical and feasible in many situations. Not only that, the use of IRCs can also help us to distinguish 
between those who foresee or intend adversely to affect the military operations or military capacity 
of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or 
objects protected against direct attack and take some practical contribution to this end from those 
who merely provide indirect support without foresight or awareness, or those who merely 
sympathise with the cause. From the information environment, we may be able to glean intelligence 
of an individual’s subjective state of mind through statements, pictures, photographs, media files, 
private communications in cyberspace, or to make an objective assessment on the basis of their 
behaviour or tacit knowledge.99 Although it is beyond the scope of this discussion, one of the 
implications of violence within our information environment is that whilst there may be many 
purportedly justifiable invasions into our privacy within the information domain and public physical 
domain, the very existence of the global information environment should help states understand the 
nature, scope and capabilities of networks and the roles that individuals play within them and take 
greater mitigation and precautionary approaches – in particular through real-time data coming from 
virtual/human networks, big data analysis, remote observation and crowd-sourced analytics. This 
should enable states to regulate themselves predominantly within the paradigm of law enforcement 
without having to resort to the permissive law of armed conflict framework on the use of force – but 
this will require ongoing dialogue between governments and their intelligence and police services. 
 
A Dangerous Guessing Game?100 
 
This discussion has suggested that in 21st century operating theatres, strategists will have to be 
highly attuned and adaptive to a broad spectrum of violence which occurs within an complex, 
cluttered and diffuse information environment which is likely to comprise a diverse range of non-
state actors who use a variety of IRCs to further the reach and lethality of their asymmetric 
strategies and unconventional responses. This global information environment serves to create 
networked wars without clear spatial or geographical fronts, that may break out in civilianised and 
urbanised terrain and which are in a constant state of flux. This challenges the ability of our legal and 
strategic frameworks both to predict and to respond appropriately, and part of the challenge here is 
to constrain the ambit of conventional military responses which are increasingly being seen to be 
ineffective and counter-productive in situations of low-intensity violence involving non-state actors 
who are globally connected.101 The indicative guidelines discussed in this paper may serve to 
promote to a high threshold of applicability law enforcement and diplomatic lines of state power 
that are based on human rights and criminal justice, in order that the legal and strategic frameworks 
of armed conflict are constrained as far as possible within a globalised environment which can 
quickly expand and escalate an area of operations far beyond those geographical zones where 
physical effects are created. Intelligence-led approaches involving well- trained, versatile and agile 
forces that can adjust to a broad spectrum of violence should continue to be developed, and one of 
their key assets needs to be constantly developing ISTAR capabilities so that they can form an astute 
situational awareness of threats in any given context, avoid intelligence failures, errors and 
manipulation, and respond using precise, discriminating and tailored application of effects.102 In 
part, this requires lawyers, target planners and strategists to engage in the type of social network 
analysis discussed in this paper, which incorporates indicative guidelines from international criminal 
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